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Note on Mortgage Discounts
Mortgages may be traded at prices below or above par, as are securities
in other capital markets. For several reasons, this practice is most common
in the case of FHA and V.A. loans. The maximum interest rates on these
mortgages are the same in all geographic areas. They have usually been set
so as to encourage lending at or near par in areas with ample supply of
funds. The government-underwritten loans are traded in an active secondary
market in which lenders buy mortgages from other lenders. In contrast, when
a conventional mortgage loan is made, the interest rate can reflect geo-
graphic differentials in interest rates and variations in the quality of loans,
as well as other individual circumstances. Also, conventional loans are rarely
traded in secondary mortgage markets. Discounts on conventional loans are
common only for junior mortgages; in this case, they usually serve to raise
the yield on these higher-risk investments to a level above the ceilings set in
the usury laws of the various states.
Discounts on government-underwritten mortgages with fixed maximum
interest rates may perform any or all of the following functions:
z. They adjust the yields on these loans to changes over time in the gen-
eral level of interest rates. A 4.5 per cent loan made iniat par, for
example, may be sold in late 1955 at a price of 97, that is, at a discount of
3 points, solely because the general level of interest rates increased during the
interval.
2. They adjust yields to regional differences in mortgage interest rates
between capital-deficit areas such as the West and Southwest and capital-
surplus areas such as New England. In addition to regional variations in
"pure" interest rates, mortgage investments made over a long distance are
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more costly. As each transaction is unique, it is more expensive to bring
together lenders and borrowers who are separated by distance.1
3. They adjust yields to differences in the terms of loans and in borrowers'
equities. Although the loans are insured or partially guaranteed by the
federal government, lenders generally accept loans with the maximum ma-
turity and smallest down payment permitted by law only at somewhat higher
yields than those expected on more conservative loans.2
4. They adjust yields to differences in the quality of the underlying se-
curity (location and construction of the house), in the credit standing of
the borrower, and in some cases in foreclosure costs (which are much higher
in some states than in others) and in redemption periods. This kind of dif-
ferentiation and the one under aboveoccur because lenders take into
account risks not covered by the insurance or guaranty contracts with
FHA or V.A.
Discounts or premiums may also vary depending on whether the loansare
offered for immediate or future delivery. Discounts are usually higher on
"stand-by" commitments than other commitments, because stand-by corn-
mitinents pledge a bank or other institution providing interim financing to
accept the mortgage if the borrower cannot dispose of it elsewhere, in which
case the price under the stand-by commitment reflects a penalty for the
borrower's failure to liquidate the interim loan.
The numerous price variations, in addition to the low degree of organiza-
tion of the secondary mortgage market, make it difficult to establish generally
applicable price quotations. The following discussion is limited to discounts
from par, since premiums were not characteristic of mortgage tharket devel-
opments in 1953-1957.
Differential Effects of Changes in Discounts and Interest Rates
Theoretically, the discount should be a perfect means of adjusting the
expected yield on fixed-interest-bearing FHA and V.A. loans to fluctuations
in the general level of interest rates. In practice, it is not. The supply of
The purchase price schedule of the Federal National Mortgage Association usually
lists separate prices for 5 groups of states. The purely geographical price spread for
any type of loan is usually a maximum of 2 points, i.e. if gg is offered for a given
type of loan in the states with the lowest discounts, 97 is offered in the states with
the highest discounts. The gradation of purchase prices from one group of states to
the next is half a point. See a sample price schedule in Review of Federal Housing
P?ograms, Annual Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th
Congress, 2nd Session, January 26, 1956, pp. 62-66.
'Thus, the FNMA price schedule referred to in note I above provides for a price
differential of half a point each for loans meeting the following criteria:(i) maturity
of 25 years or less as against maturity of more than 25 years, and (2) down payments
of 10 per cent or more of appraised value, of 5 per cent or more but less than xo
per cent, and of less than 5 per cent.
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funds for mortgage investment does not respond to increases in discounts
as freely as it would respond to increases in interest rates, and large dis-
counts have effects on home builders' operations that differ from the effects
of high interest rates.
Large numbers of financial institutions are reluctant to acquire govern-
ment-underwritten mortgage loans at high discounts. They feel that such
transactions may expose them to public disapproval because they have an
aura of "unethical" practice. While perfectly understood and accepted in
the case of securities negotiated in free markets by financiers and corpora-
tions or governments, the discount is still widely considered to be in a differ-
ent class when loans to consumers and especially government-underwritten
loans are involved. Consequently, some institutions refrain from lending on
government-underwritten mortgages when high discounts would be required
to make the yields on such mortgages competitive with those on other in-
vestments. This attitude is reinforced by recurrent adverse Congressional
reaction to discounts. Whenever discounts have reached high levels, Con-
gressional committees or influential members of both Houses have expressed
the view that the acquisition of government-underwritten mortgages at less
than par circumvents the intent of Congress in setting maximum interest
rates. Thus, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing of the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee stated at a hearing on mortgage market
problems in late 1955:"Thediscounting of V.A.-guaranteed and FHA-
insured loans is a recurring practice that tends to negate public policy." 8
Twice within the period 1950-1957,thisview has been legislated into a
mandate to both the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans
Administration to control discounts (see below).
As for the home builders, high discounts tend to reduce their profit mar-
gins to the point where they cut down or even suspend operations under
the government programs. This tendency, in turn, reduces total home build-
ing since the larger down-payment requirements and shorter maturities for
conventional loans make substitution of conventional for government-under-
written financing difficult. The direct impact of high discounts on builders'
profit margins is associated with the fact that FHA and V.A. appraisals in
principle do not recognize discounts as cost items that may be included in
appraised values. Under the law, the "reasonable value" placed by V.A. on
the property also controls the maximum price the veteran is permitted to
pay for the home. In the case of FHA loans, the home buyer is not legally
prohibited from paying more than the appraised value, but the latter deter-
mines the necessary down payment; moreover, as FHA is required to inform
'Mortgage Market Problems, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Bank-
ing and Currency Committee, 84th Congress, 1st Session, November 28-29, 1955,
p. 102.
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him of its appraisal, the purchaser will rarely be inclined to pay a price
substantially exceeding the FHA-appraised value.
If appraisal practice conforms to principle, the discount must be absorbed
by the builder or, in the case of existing property, the seller. Builders' profits
are usually large enough to make it possible for them to absorb moderate
discounts. But when discounts reach high levels, operations tend to become
unprofitable. This may be illustrated by the following example:
Sale Without Mortgage Discount Sale with Mortgage Discount
Sales price $12,000 Sales price $12,000
Cost to builder 11,200 Cost to builder:
Profit to builder 800 Land and building11,200
Discounta 720
Total 11,920
Profit to builder 80
eAssumes a discount of 6 points on a $12,000 mortgage loan which equals the
sales price, as it may under the veterans' home loan program.
In this case, the builder would be unlikely to proceed with the project if he
knew that the mortgage could be marketed only at the specified discount.
The discount has a direct effect on his production schedule. A higher interest
rate, on the other hand, would influence his production schedule only
through the effect of the higher rate on housing demand. Since the demand
for homes is much more sensitive to down-payment requirements and mort-
gage loan maturities than to changes in interest rates as such, this effect is
not only indirect but less pronounced.
Appraisal practice, however, does not necessarily conform to principle.
Builders attempt to obtain higher appraisals when discounts increase and,
the art of appraising property being less than precise, they may succeed in
an appreciable number of cases. The evidence on this point is not clear.
The Administrator of Veterans Affairs stated in 1957: "During the past i8
months, increasing pressures have been brought to bear on the Veterans
Administration to establish higher and allegedly 'more realistic' reasonable
values. Although the Veterans Administration does not contend that it has
been wholly successful in defeating efforts of builders to include discounts
in the purchase price of the home, it is believed that ...appraisalshave
required builders generally to absorb a substantial portion of the discount
involved in the financing of their units."Others have held that V.A.
appraisers in many local offices have been easily persuaded to "stretch"
appraisals when discounts are high. In any event, to the extent that large
mortgage loan discounts tended to raise appraised values and purchase
'Letter of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs to the Chairman of the House
Committee on Veterans Affairs, in Hearings before the House Committee on Veterans
Affairs, 85th Congress, First Session, January 24-February 6, p. 19.
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prices, the home buyer paid for the discount in the form of a higher price
and through payments on a larger mortgage than would otherwise be re-
quired. In the above example of sale with mortgage discount, the price
might have been increased from $i 2,ooo to $12,600, leaving the builder with
a profit of $68o. The buyer would pay the larger purchase price on the
strength of the V.A. appraisal and also because he often has no alternative to
the no-down-payment, or low-down-payment, long-maturity loan available
through the V.A. guaranty.
No matter how successful the government agencies were in resisting the
pressures for making allowances for discounts in their appraisals, the build-
ers' ability to pass high discounts along to the home buyer in the form of
higher purchase prices depended also on the strength of housing demand.
In 1956 and 1957 demand was probably not strong enough to make it
possible for builders generally to pass along all or even most of the discounts
to home purchasers, although this may have been true in certain areas. If
this interpretation of market conditions is correct, high discounts had the
effect of reducing the production schedules of builders. The difficulties were
compounded when Congress, in the Housing Act of July 1957, established
discount controls, which, however, were repealed in April i
Control of Discounts
The episode of discount controls between July 1957 and April 1958 re-
peated the experience with similar restrictions imposed under Congressional
mandate in 1950, substantially modified in June 1953, and finally withdrawn
in August 1954. The removal of uncertainty over the legality of discounts
was one of the factors in the great expansion of mortgage investment by
major financial institutions in 1954 and 1955 and in the associated increase
in residential building.
In response to what appears to have been a flagrant abuse,° Congress,
hi the Housing Act of 1950 (Section 504), authorized and directed both
the FHA and V.A. to limit fees and charges imposed upon builders and
home purchasers in connection with loans insured or guaranteed by the
agencies. The interpretation of this legislative mandate and its enforcement
proved to be extremely difficult. The FHA and V.A. issued regulations
Cf. Housing Act of '1957,PublicLaw 85-104, 85th Congress, approved July 12,
1957,Sec. 605. Also, Public Law 85-364, 85th Congress, approved April 1958, Sec. 6.
'The abuse occurred in connection with government-underwritten mortgage loans
tendered to the Federal National Mortgage Association which at that time bought
these loans at par and issued advance commitments to lenders. Mortgage originators
charged builders substantial sums for obtaining the financing which eventually resulted
in mortgages acquired at par by a government agency. Cf. Housing Act of 1957,
Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Banking and Currency
Committee, March 4-15, 1957,pp.83-9 i.
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limiting permissible discounts, but dubious practices were quick to develop
and confronted the agencies with a veritable Pandora's box of legal ques-
tions. The Veterans Administration's instructions to its field offices on this
issue over a period of little more than one year cover 20 pages of line print
in a Congressional document.1 The government lawyers found it impossible
to keep pace with new arrangements which might or might not be within
the law. Transactions approved at first were disapproved later, and vice
versa.8 In August 1952, the agency, inundated by a flood of inquiries, began
to refuse to render any advance opinions on the validity of proposed arrange-
ments involving discounts or other charges and fees, leaving mortgage
lenders in a state of heightened uncertainty.9 The acute uncertainty arid the
penalties for violation—including in the case of V.A. the abrogation of the
guaranty contract for loans, suspension from participation in the G.L home
loan program, and criminal prosecution—caused an increasing number of
financial institutions to withdraw from the market for government-under-
written mortgages. This was true particularly for the veterans' home loans
on which discounts were more widespread and larger than for FHA loans.
In response to representations by both builders and lenders, Congress
in June 1953 attempted to remedy the situation by an amendment exempt-
ing from control "any loss suffered by an originating lender in the bona fide
sale or pledge of or an agreement to sell the mortgage." 10Theeffect was
to permit builders to absorb any discounts that mortgage loan originators
incurred when they disposed of FHA and V.A. loans by sale to permanent
investors. But the control of discounts charged by lenders originating
mortgages for retention in their investment portfolio was maintained. The
amendment brought some measure of relief and at the same time created
new problems by placing the financial institutions that were making loans
directly at a competitive disadvantage. These types of lenders were averse
to continuing their customary mode of operation when they could improve
mortgage yields by buying FHA or V.A. loans from others. Thus, the whole
operational structure of the mortgage market was upset. The legislative
mandate for discount control was finally repealed in August 1954,11after
'The Mortgage Interest Rate Problem, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Congress,1stSession, January
28, 1953.
For the complex and confused detail, see ibid.; also, Act of 1957,ascited,
pp. 83-9!.
'Veterans Administration, Technical Bulletin 4A-124, August 22,1952.
PublicLaw 94, Section 23, 83rd Congress, approved June 30, 1953, 67th Stat.
12!,127.
HousingAct of 7954, Section 813, Public Law 560, 83rd Congress, Second Ses-
sion, approved August 2, 1954.
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the mortgage market had eased so much that the control was obviously
unnecessary. For three years thereafter, the Federal Housing Administration
and the Veterans Administration confined their regulations, as they had
before 1950,toprohibiting discount charges to the borrower and establishing
maximum amounts for other charges to him, while leaving discount arrange-
ments between builders or other sellers of property and the mortgage lender,
as well as those between parties to a transaction in the secondary mortgage
market, to competitive market forces.
The reimposition of discount controls in July 1957 hastened the demise
of the veterans' home loan program, although the controls allowed some-
what greater administrative flexibility than had been possible under the
earlier version. In the case of the FHA program, increased maximum interest
rates, which were permitted under existing administrative discretion, sof-
tened the impact of the regulation of discounts. The removal of discount
controls in April 1958,coupledwith Congressional authorization to raise
the maximum interest rate on V.A. loans from 4.5 to 4.75 per cent, again
came at a time when credit eased, mortgage funds became more freely
available, and discounts tended to decline.12
Fora discussion of mortgage discounts and their market implications, see also
Saul B. Kiaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, Princeton for National
Bureau of Economic Research, in press, Chapter 4.
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